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A disinflation strategy that involved eliminating  the fiscal deficit and changing
the rules of the government-labor game reduced inflation,  in Israel from more
than 400 percent a year in 1984  to a low 20 percent a year in the third year of
the program.
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Tlhe  stabilization program Israel launched in July  srwending.  Under government pressure, employ-
1985 combined orthodox fiscal and monetary  ers'  organizations and organized labor reached a
policies wiut a heterodox incomes policy.  wage agreement in July 1985 that prevented
substantial unemployment. This approach -
The orthodox elements included a sharp  not intended for use in normal times - proved
reduction in the fiscal-operational deficit - 8  effective in administering shock treatment.
percent of GNP in the first six months - and
tight monetary policy.  The result? At the _nd of the program's
third year, inflation is running a low 20 percent
The heterodox element was to freeze wages  annually, compared with more than 400 percent
and prices and peg the exchange rate to the U.S.  in 1984.
dollar.  Wage and price controls were relaxed in
1986 and 1987, leaving exchange rate policy  Whether stabilization will survive the
(later pegged to the basket of currencies) as the  November 1988 elections remains to be seen.
anchor in the new system.
The stabilization programs in Argentina (in
The national coalition government suc-  1985) and Mexico (in 1988) were similar in the
ceeded in neutralizing pressures for deficit  initial stages to Israel's.
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Israel's  stabilization  program,  which  via launched  in  July  1985,  was
of the Oheterodoxs  variety,  namely  one  which  romblied  orthodox  elements  with
incomes  policies. The  orthodox  part  cQnsisted  of a sharp  reduction  in  the
fiscal  (operational)  deficit,  of the  order  of 8Z  of GNP  in the  first  six
months,  and  a  very tight  monotary  policy  during  this  period. The  heterodox
component  took  the  form  of an initial  wage-price  freeze  which,  together  with
pegging  the  exchange  rate  to the  U.S.  dollar  brought  about  a sharp  reduction
in lnflation  - from  around  152  per  month  in the  first  half of 1985  to  3.5Z  in
August-September  and  to 1.5-22  later  on.  Under  the  pressure  of the  goverrment
the  workers'  and  employers'  organizations  reached  a  wage agreement  in  July
1985  which  signified  the  publlc's  support  for  the  program. Prices  were  made
more  flexible  and  controls  were gradually  removed  in the  course  of 1986  and
1987.
Israel  was  not alone  in  following  this  type  stabilization  strategy.
The  Austral  program  in  Argentina  (1985)  and  the  recent  stabilization  policy  in
Mexico  (1988)  are  of a similar  variety,  at least  as far  as  the initial  stages
are  concerned. It is also  very  likely  that  future  stabilization  programs  in
chronic  inflation  countries  will adopt  a  basically  similar  approach. The
intereit  in  the  Israeli  stabilization  program  extends  therefore  beyond  its
domestic  implications.  This  is  especially  the  case  since  the  program  has  been
doing  quite  well so far (as  will  be described  below).-2-
Israel's  stabilization  program  is  nearing  now  the  end  of its  third
year  ane  inflation  is still  running  at  a low  level  of about  202  annually,  as
compared  with over  4002  in 1984. Disinflation  is  not  supported  any  more  by
the  comprehensive  system  of  price  controls  which  characterized  the  initial
phase  and  the  coverage  of  controls  teturned  to its  normal  level. The  main
nominal  anchor  in the  system  is  the  exchange  rate  which  was  practically  fixed
relative  to the  basket  of  currencies  since  the  last  devaluation  of January
1987.
The  year  1987  witnessed  acceleration  of  growth  in the  economy  which
was  not  accompanied  by any  marked  deterioration  in trade  accoui
phenomenon  which  undermined  many exchange  rate  based  stabilizations.  The
current  account  was  practically  balanced  in  1987  and reserves  were at record
high  levels  compared  with recent  years. The  public  sector's  budget  remai,Led
nearly  balanced  and  the  government  initiated  a  number  of reforms  in  the  area
of direct  taxation  and  capital  market  regulations  which,  together  with  price
stability,  contributed  to the  recovery  of  domestic  investment  after  years  of
decline.
On a different  level,  price  stability  has  become  a political  asset
which  none  of the  major  parties  in  the  four-year-old  coalition  government
would  wish to damage. In spite  of the  nearing  elections  the  two  major
partners  in the  coalition  have  acted  more  as  watchdogs  to  each  other,  rather
than  as competitors  in  over  spending  in their  respective  ministries.
In this  paper  I shall  try  to analyze  the  major  factors  which  made the
transition  to low  inflation  possible. We shall  deal  with such  issues  as the
role  of the  U.S. aid  and  of  domestic  fiscal  adjustment,  of  monetary  and
.exchange  rate  policies  and  of  the  change  in  the  rules  of game  concerning
government-labor  interactions.  The  paper  will focus  on the  evaluation  of the-3-
program  from  the  1987  perspective  without  devoting  much space  to the  initial
heterodox  shock  which  was  described  in  various  other  papers.  11
From  the  point  of  view  of this  objective  the  data  which  summarize  the
developments  in  1987, which  have  now  become  available,  are  particularly
useful. This  is so  since  this  yas  the  first  year in  which  the  economy  can  be
said  to  have recovered  from  the  heterodox  shock  of July  1985  and  adjusted  to
the  low  inflation  environment.
A related  topic  with  which  we shall  be concerned  is  the  evolution  of
the  disinflationary  policies  in the  course  of the  program. Here  again  the
1987  data  will  help  us in  diaentangling  the  transitory  from  the  more lasting
elements  of the  Israeli  disinflation  strategy.
In the  final  part  of the  paper  we shall  deal  with the  policy  dilemmas
which  face  the  government  at the  present  stage  of disinflation.  In spite  of
the  rosy  picture  of 1987  one  cannot  ignore  some  problematic,  features  of the
program. One  disturbing  fact  is  that  the  fixed  exchange  rate  policy  followed
in the  past  year  and  a  half  has  not  succeeded  in  reducing  the  level  of the
crawling  inflation  and  consequently  a process  of real  appreciation  has  been
taking  place  continuouely.  This  may  have contributed  to the  recessionary
symptoms  in  the  first  half  of 1988.
One  of the  main  merits  of the  Israeli  stabilization  was its  ability
to  avoid  a  heavy  cost in  terms  of unemployment  by adopting  a  well-coordinated
heterodox  program  based  on  a great  degree  of cooperation  with  organized  labor.
However,  while  this  approach  proved  to  be effective  in  administering  the  shock
treatment  it is  not intended  to  be used  in  the  same  way in  normal  times. It
is  especially  after  the  big  achievement  of  bringing  down inflation  from  a  very
high  level  that  the  public  suspects  that  the  government  will  not fight  to
eliminate  a  low  inflation  step.  This,  however,  may  set  an  expectational
pattern  which  may lead  to  unstable  developments.Much  of the  success  in stabilization  was due  to  the  formation  of the
national  coalition  governmint  which  succeeded  in  neutralizing  pressures  for
deficit  spending  and  wage increases.  As the  November  elections  are
approaching  the  ability  to  maintain  the  foregoing  framework  is put  under
severe  stresses  the  outcome  of  which  is  still  uinknown.  These  pressures  are
already  reflected  in  the  preliminary  indicators  which  show  an  increase  in  the
domestic  fiscal  deficit  since  the  last  quarter  of  1987.
The  policy  issues  involving  the  low  inflation  step  and  the  real
appreciation  will be  discussed  towards  the  end  of the  paper. I shall  begin
with a  brief  summary  of nominal  and  real  effects  of disinflation  as  viewed
from  1987  perspective.
I.  The  Current  State  of Stabilization
1.  The  nominal  System
For  the  past two  and  a  half  years  inflation  has  been  runnizig  at  an
annual  rate  of about  twenty  percent. In the  immediate  period  following  the
July  1985  heterodox  shock,  over  902  of the  consumer's  basket  was under  price
controls,  in  a framework  of a  wage-price  freeze  designed  to break  inflationary
inertia.  However,  as  a  result  of the  decontrol  process  which  started  in  the
beginning  of 1986  the  coverage  was reduced  to  46Z  in  January  1987,  while  by
the  end  of that  year  only  20-25?  of the  consumers,  basket  was  still  under
control. This  corresponds  to the  traditional  level  of price  controls  which
covers  some  basic  foodstuffs,  government  services  and  goverunent  controlled
monopolies. Thus  at the  present  stage  controls  (or  the  threat  of their
reimposition)  play  only  a  minor  role  in  keeping  inflation  at a low  level.The basic  nominal  anchor  which  supports  the  program  is  the  exchange
rate. Although  the  exclunge  rate  with respect  to  the  basket  of currencLes  has
been  held  practically  fixed  since  January  7 the  government  is not  commltted
to  maintain  the  exchange  rate  indefinitely  :  the  present  level.  In
principle,  the  government  retains  the  option  of  realigning  the  exchange  rate
with  the  developoent  in  nominal  wages  if  it  will  deem  it  necessaryt  this
optlon  has  not  been  excerciseci  however,  in the  past  18  months.
Since  the  beginning  of the  stabilization  program  the  public's
credibility  in the  government's  commitment  to avoid  inflationary  shocks  has
increased.  One sign  of  this  development  is  the  average  low  level,  and  lack  of
trend,  in  the  black  dollar  premium  (see  fig.  1).
The  reduction  of  inflationary  expectations  following  the  initiation
of  the  program  is  of  course  reflected  in  the  sharp  reduction  in  nomdnal
interest  rates  which  is commensurate  vith the  reduction  in inflation  (see
table  1).  While  the  nominal  interest  rates  on shekel  deposits  stabilized  at
the  level  of  actual  inflation  the  interest  rate  on  credit  lines  in  the
domestic  market  (denominated  in shekels)  stabilized  at a  higher  level. The
meaning  of the  large  spread  21 in  interest  rates  (table  1) is  not fully
understood  but it  presumably  reflects  mostly  factors  not related  to
inflationary  expectations  (one  of these  are  monopolistic  practices  by  the
highly  concentrated  banking  system  and  another  is  tight  monetary  policy  with
respect  to activities  in  the  domestic  market). 31
The  increase  in the  weight  of  nominal  (non-indexed)  liquid  Pssets  iti
a coamon  expression  of the  reduction  in inflationary  expectations.  The
continued  growth  of  M1 and  H2 relative  to  GNP (see  table  2) indicates  a
growing  confidence  in  the  increased  price  stability.-6-
It  must be stressed  that  the  foregoing  indicators  reflect  basically
short  term  attitudes  and  do  not say  much about  the  robustness  of the  nominal
system  to shocks. Some indication  in  the  latter  direction  was the
surprisingly  small  effect  of the  January  1987  devaluation  (of  ten  percent)  on
the  acceleration  of inflation  in the  course  of the  year.  One  of the  reasons
for  this  phenomenon  was the  'cooperative'  nature  of this  devaluation  to  which
we shall  return  later  on.
Another  indicator  for  the  robustness  of the  nominal  system  concerns
the  length  of  nominal  contracts. The  most  significant  indicator  in the  area
Is  the  structure  of the  cost  of living  agreement.  Here  rsther  slow  progress
has  been  made,  the  main  aspect  of  which  was the  increase  in  the  trigger  level
of  inflation  for  COLA  purpcses  from  a  cumulative  42 to 71  from  mid-1986  .4
Some  further  progress  in  this  direction  is  expected  with the  new collective
wage agreement.
In financial  markets  lengthening  of  nominal  contracts  is foun4  in
many areas. For  example,  there  is  a shift  to longer  term (non-indexed)  time
deposits  and  there  appears  a  greater  tendency  by  firms  to  use fixed-time  loans
rather  than  overdraft  facilities.  The  length  of  consumer  loans  extended  by
firms  has  also  increased  significantly.  Tne  general  impression  is  that  the
length  of  nominal  contracts  is  increasing  continuously  but  at  a  moderate  pace.
2.  Real  Effects  of  Disinflation
The  transition  to  the  low  Inflation  plateau  has  been  achieved  with  a
surprisingly  small  increase  in  unemployment  which  reached  62  in  1987  (dropping
from  71  in  1986)  compared  with  51  in  1984. The  fact  that  unemployment  did  not
increase  such  during  the  first  stage  of  stabilization  (comprising  6-9  months),
In  spite  of  the  extremely  tight  monetary  policy,  constitutes  one  of the  main
successes  of  the  heterodox  approach.  This  was- 7  -
achieved  by breaking  inflationary  inertia  due  to lagged  wage indexation  by
means  of a  wage-price  freeze  (thus  preventing  a rise  in real  wages  when  the
exchange  rate  was stabilized),  and  by reaching  an agreement  with labor  for  a
temporary  reduction  in  real  wages during  the  first  stage.
The  first  stage  was  also  characterized  by a sharp  reduction  in  the
dcmestLc  fiucal  deficit  (which  turned  into  a  surplus  in  1986)  whLch  calmed
down  the  financial  markets  and  constituted  a  first  step  in  establishing
credibility  in  the  program.
The second  stage,  which  coincided  roughly  with 1986.  was
characterized  by a sharp  recovery  of domestic  demands  (8.5 in real  terms)
without  a  corresponding  increase  in  output  (real  GNP  grew  only  by 3.32). This
was  a  surprising  development  in  view  of the  elimination  of the  fiscal  deficit.
The  consumption  boom  assoclated  with this  etage  and  the  related  developments
will  be  analyzed  more  fully  later.  The  rise  in  demands  was  accompanled  by  a
marked  real  appreciation  and  an  increasing  import  surplus  in  constant  prices,
which  were  characteristic  feitures  of  many  unsuccessful  exchange  rate  based
stabilizations.
However,  this  pessimistic  phase  reversed  itself  in 1987  when the
growth  of  domestic  demands  tapered  off  to  5.82  while  output,  which  began  to
adjust  to  the  new  environment,  responded  more  vigorously  to  demands  with  GNP
increasing  by 5.2S.  The  rate  of  real  appreciation  slowed  down considerably
indicating  a  possible  convergence  to  a  lower  real  exchange  rate,  which  may.
however,  not  be  sustainable  (we  shall  return  to  this  point  later).
The  import  surplus  continued  to  grow  i  cdollar  terms  but  this
reflects  to  a  large  extent  the  weakening  of the  dollar.  Measured  at constant
prices  the  import  surplus  grew  in 1987  at about  the  same  rate  as  GNP,  while
measured  in  current  prices  the  ratio  of  the  import  surplus  to  GNP  rose
moderately  (from  6  to  7  percent).It is  especially  noteworthy  that  output  of the  business  sector  was
growing  at an accelerated  rate  for  the  past  three  years  reaching  an
exceptionally  high rate  (7Z)  in  1987.  This  was accompanied  by an
unprecedented  growth  in  total  productivity  (compared  with  the  past  fifteen
years)  which  accounted  for  more  than  half  of  the  growth  of  output  (table  1).
Host  economists  tend  to  attribute  this  remarkable  growth  performance
to the  redu:uion  in inflation,  to  the  contraction  of the  relative  size  of
public  sector  and  to  the  reforms  undertaken  in 1987. The  drop  in  inflation
reduced  producers,  uncertainty  with regard  to relative  prices  and  shifted
activities  from  the  financial  to  the  productive  sphere. This  process  took
place  both  within  firms  as  well  as on industry  level  through  a change  in the
distribution  of the  labor-force  in  favor  of the  non-financial  sector.
The  government  contributed  to the  process  by freezing  the  number  of
employees  in  the  public  sector,  so  that  practically  the  entire  increase  in  the
labor-force  in 1986  and  1987  was absorbed  by the  business  sector  (see  AR 87,5/
p. 73). In addition  the  goverament  took  the  first  steps  in reformiug
the  structure  of direct  taxes  which  resulted  in  a reduction  of personal  income
tax  rates  as  well  as corporate  tax  rates  61 (for  details  see  AR 87,  chapter  on
the  public  sector). These  reforms  may  have  contributed  to the  continued  rise
in  productivity  and  to nutput  growth. In addition,  price  stability  and  the
reduced  corporate  tax  rate  stimulated  the  upsurge  of investment  in the
business  sector  in  1987.  The  latter  process  was further  encouraged  by some
initial,  but  important,  steps  in  the  direction  of liberalizing  capital
markets.
There  are  some  indications  of  a  weakening  of  the  growth  momentum in
1988  as  is  shown  by  preliminary  evidence  from  demand  and  production  data  as
well  as  from  the  behavior  of  imports  and  commercial  bank  credit.  It  istherefore  not  clear  as  yet  whether  the  growth  performance  of 1987  was a
transitory  phase  rather  that  a  take  off  point  for  growth  ln  a stable
environment.
If the  recessionary  indications  represent  a  real  underlying  problem
then  the  question  is to  what extent  are  these  developments  due  to the  policies
adopted  in the  course  of the  program  and  in  particular  to  the  fixed  exchange
rate  policy  pursued  in  the  past  18  months.  We *hall  return  to  these  issues
later  on  when  we  shall  discuss  current  policy  dilemas.
II.  The  Change  of  Regimes
The  InflationarZ  Regime
In  order  to  analyze  the  factors  that  brought  about  the  change  of
regimes  which  characterized  the  transition  to the  low  inflation  economy  we
must  review  briefly  the  forces  behind  the  inflationary  process  prior  to 1985.
This  process  was  associated  with  two  basic  interrelated  mechanisms.
One of these  was  related  to  the  balance  of  payments  crises  of 1974,
1979,  and  1983  which  were  partly  due  to  external  causes  (the  Yom  Kippur  war
and  the  two  oil  crises)  and  partly  to faulty  exchange  rate  poiicies  (the
attempt  to reduce  the  rate  of devaluation  in 1982-1983  without  a fiscal
adjustment). The  policy  reactions  to  these  crises  entailed  severe  nominal
shocks  which  could  not  be confined  to level-shocks  to  prices  but  were instead
transformed  to lovq  term  increases  in  the  inflation  level  (on  this  see
Liviatan  and  Piterman  (1986)3.
One  of  the  channels  through  which  the  foregoing  mechanism  operated
was  related  to  the  need  to  reduce  the  real  wage  in  order  to  cope  with  the- 10  -
external  crises  in a setting  of  highly  indexed  wages. Under  the  circumstances
prevailing  at the  time  the  method  which  seemed  suitable  to deal  with the
sitzation  was to  erode  the  real  wage by  stepping  up the  rate  of devaluation
and  the  rate  of 'nflation  of government  controlled  prices  which  acted  as a
trigger  for  general  inflation.  Thsi  mechanism  was  especially  evident  in the
balance  of payments  crises  of 1979  and  1983. We may  note  that  under  a system
of full  wage indexation  a given  permanent  reduction  in  the  real  wage requires
a permanent  increase  in  the  inflation  plateau  [these  issues  are  discussed  more
fully  in  Liviatan  (1986b)J*
The  main lesson  from  the  foregoing  developments  was that  attempts  by
the  government  to  erode  the  real  wage  by stepping  up inflation  led  to an ever
increasing  inflationary  spiral. This  brought  up the  idea  of dealing  with
inflation  by  means  of a cooperative  strategy.
This  s3lutioa  became  potentially  possible  with  the  formation  of the
coalition  government  in  1984  which  represented  both  labor  and  right-wing
parties. The  new  anti-inflationary  prlicy  at the  end  of 1984  took  the  form  of
a social  pact (or  'package  deal")  to control  wages  and  prices. The  policy
failed,  however,  because  it  was  not  part  of a coordinated  nominal  policy  and,
more importantly,  it  was  not supported  by a sufficient  fiscal  adjustment  [see
Liviatan  (1 986b)I.
Another  lesson  from  the  foregoing  inflationary  process  is  that  in  a
highly  indexed  economy  one  cannot  deal  with inflation  under  stresses  in the
balance  of payments  because  the  adjustment  in the  real  wage,  which  is
ordinarily  required  in  this  type  of situation,  invites  inflationary  measures.
A  sound  external  position  is therefore  e  prerequisite  for  conducting  a
disinflation  program.- 11 -
So  much for  the  mechanism  associated  with  handling  of balance  of
payments  crises  in  an indexed  economy. The  other  mechaism was assoclated
with the  domestic  fiscal  deficit. The  latter  deficit  affected  the
inflationary  process  in  a  rather  roundabout  way.  In  particular,  the  revenue
from  money  creation  was always  rather  small  - around  2U  of GNP.  (In  fact  it
remained  around  thls  level  after  stabilization  in  1986-87  (see  table  3)].
The  large  fiscal  deficits  were finance  instead  by indexed  government
debt  which  the  public  accepted  willingly  (much  of this  can  be explained,
presumably,  by Richardian  equivalance  considerations).  Thus,  till  the  early
1980's  the  fiscal  deficit  did  not  exert  a direct  inflationary  pressure.
However,  the  growing  ratio  of domestic  debt  to  GNP  approached  a level  (about
1.3)  beyond  which  it  became  difficult  to  finance  the  public  deficlt  though  new
debt.
This  was  reflected  by the  growing  proportion  of the  deficit  which  had
to  be financed  by the  sale  of foreign  exchange  to the  public  in  1983  and  1984
(see  table  3).  The  capital  flight  associated  with  this  process  led  to foreign
exchange  difficulties  even  when the  current  account  improved  in  1984.  This
state  of affairs  led  to  expectations  of a further  stepping  up of tho
rate  of devaluation  which  intensified  the  pessimistic  view  about  the  ability
to  control  inflation.  As a result  of these  developments  it  became  clear  that
any  disinflationary  program  must stop  completely  the  growth  of the  public
debt,  which  implles  a  balanced  budget. Only  in  this  way  could  the  government
restore  confidence  in its  ability  to service  the  debt  and  avoid  a foreign
exchange  crisis.- 12 -
2.  The  Change  in  the  Rules  of the  Game
In  the  new regime  which  followed  the  July  1985  heterodox  shock  the
government  abandoned  the  policy  of using  devaluations  in a one-sided  manner  in
order  to regulate  real  wages.  Instead  the  government  established  what appears
to  be a  fixed  exchange  rate  policy  over  long  steps  which  implicitly  enables
carrying  out  maxi-devaluation  within  the  framework  of a social  contract.
The  first  devaluation  in  this  regime  was the  initial  one  of July
1985. The  cost  push  effects  of this  devaluation  were sterilized  by means  of
an agreement  (following  heavy  government  pressure)  to suspend  the  COLA system
for  three  months,  in  the  framework  of  a  wage-price  freeze,  accompanied  by  an
agreed  temporary  reduction  in  real  wages  (as  mentioned  earlier).
The  only  formal  devaluation  initiated  by the  government  in the  posts
stabilization  era  was in  January  1987. The  purpose  of the  devaluation  was to
correct  the  excessive  increase  in  real  wages  in the  course  of 1986. However,
unlike  the  one  sided  policies  in the  pre-stabilization  period  it  was carried
out  this  time  in  cooperation  with  the  General  Organization  of  Labor  (the
Histadrut)  and  the  organization  of  employers.
In this "package  deal  the  workers  agreed  to give  up  half  of the  COLA
payment  due  in  March  71  and  the  government  reduced  the  employer's
contributions  to  the  national  insurance  by  a  similar  amount.  This  sterilized
the  cost  effect  of  the  devaluatlon  through  the  COLA  system.  The  remaining
direct  cost  effects  were  supposed  to  be  absorbed  by  the  employers.
The  use  of the  foregoing  strategy,  which  was facilitated  by the
fiscal  surplus,  prevented  the  creation  of  a  possible  wage-price  spiral  so that
the  low  inflation  plateau  was  not  disturbed.  [see  table  13].
We may infer  from  this  experiment  that  the  government  is  most
reluctant  to  carry  out  one  sided  devaluations.  If  this  type  of  policy  can  be- 13 -
repeated  in  the  future  then  Israel  seems  to  have solved  the  extremely
dlfficult  problem  of adjusting  the  real  wage by a  nominal  devaluation  in  a
highly  indexed  setting  without  raising  the  inflation  plateau. It is  doubtful,
however,  whether  the  same  method  can  be implemented  on  a long  &irm  basis  under
changing  political  conditions.  This  is  a  question  which  one  cannot  answer  at
the  present  stage.
The  Focus  on the  External  Position
The  foregoing  change  of  regime  which  required  a  stable  exchange  rate
policy  could  not  have  taken  place  without  relying  on  a  sound  external
position. With a continuing  pressure  on the  exchange  rate,  or  with strong
speculative  waves,  such  a policy  would  not  be  credible  and  it  would  not  have
been  possible  to  secure  the  workers,  cooperation  in  maintaining  stability.  It
is  therefore  important  to focus  the  analysis  on the  external  position.
Indeed  we can see  in table  1 that  all  the  conventional  indicators  of
the  external  position  show  a dramatic  improvement  with  the  stabilization  in
1985. The  chronic  current  account  deficit  was  reversed  to  a large  surplus  in
1985  and  1986  and  remained  approximately  balanced  in  1987.  The  import
surplus,  as  percent  of GNP,  declined  (table  2).  Foreign  exchange  reserves
increased  and  the  net  external  debt  was stabilized  in  dollar  terms  and
declinei  as  percent  of GNP.  Thus,  it  appears  that  the  requirement  that
nominal  stabilization  should  rely  on a sound  external  position  was fulfilled.
Since  the  transformation  in  the  external  position  is considered  to  be
such  a crucial  aspect  of stabilization  we have  to investigate  the  internal  and
external  developments  which  brought  about  the  change. We shall  try  to
distinguish  between  temporary  and  permanent  aspects  of  the  changes  which  have
taken  place  and  differentLate  between  substantive  aspects  and  appearances.- 14 -
The  factors  which  affect  the  external  position  include  exchange  rate
policy,  foreign  aid,  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  and  various  exogenous
developments  such  as  changes  in  terms  of trade. These  factors  may influence
domestic  absorption  and  therefore  the  import  surplus. In  addition  foreign  aid
influences  unilateral  transfers  which  are  part  of the  the  current  account.
The  foreign  exchange  reserves  are  potentially  affected,  among  other  things,  by
exchange  rate  stabilization,  foreign  aid  and  various  expectational
considerations  (not  unrelated  to the  aforementioned  set  of factors).
4.  The  Effect  of  Stabilizins  the  Exchange  Rate  on  Reserves
Any  policy  which  reduces  inflation  drastically  by  pegging  the
exchange  rate  tends  to influence  the  foreign  exchange  reserves  of the  central
bank  because  of the  increased  demand  for  money  which  induces  capital  inflows.
However,  in  the  case  of Israel  this  mechanism  was  of  minor  significance
because  the  central  bank  enabled  the  public  to  convert  its  dollar  linked
deposits  into  domestic  money  at a fixed  rate  of exchange.
Table  3 shows  that  the  big  initial  shift  in portfolio  in  favor  of
domestic  money in  the  second  half  of 1985,  amounting  to 112  of GNP,  took  place
without  changing  the  base  of  M3,8/ implying  that  the  entire  portfolio
shift  was accomplished  by an exchange  of domestic  assets  only.  This  suggests
that  the  change  in  reserves  cannot  be explained  simply  by the  change  in  the
asset  portfolio  as a result  of disinflation.  The  causality  runs  in the  other
direction  - it  is  the  Improvement  in reserves  which  facilitated  disinflation.
The  stabilization  of  the  exchange  rate  may  also  have  important
effects  on  the  real  variables  (consumption  and  investment)  to the  extent  that
it  is  considered  to  be  temporary.  We shall  return  to  this  aspect  later.- 15 -
5.  The  Role  of  U.S.  Aid
One  of the  factors  which  helped  to  bolster  he foreign  exchange
reserves  of the  Bank  of Israel  was  the  special  U.S. grant  of 1.5  billion
dollars  (divided  into  two  equal  installments  in  1985  and  1986). This  may
account  for  most the  increase  in reserves  over  the  stabilizatlon  period  (see
table  1) if  we take  into  account  that  the  additlonal  increase  in 1987  was due
to the  developments  following  the  devaluation  of January  of that  year.
It is  conceivable  that  reserves  would  not  have increased  and  that  the
grant  would  be spent,  say,  on consumption.  However,  because  of the  temporary
nature  of the  grant  we expect  it to  be added  to savings  without  affecting  the
flow  of total  consumption  (Private  plus  government)  in the  economy,  as
permanent  income  theory  would predict. This  aspect  is  one  of the  reasons  for
the  bulge  in  the  current  acco;mt  in  1985  and  1986.
In spite  of the  foregoing  consideration  the  reserves  may  not  have
increased  because  of  capital  flight  resulting  from  lack  of confidence  in  the
program. However,  the  very  boost  to reserves  made the  program  more  credible.
Thus,  the special  grant  performed  the  role  of a financial  *safety  net  which
did  not  have  to  be used in  practice. Clearly,  the  special  grant  does  not
represent  any  fundamental  charge  but  it  proved  to  be very  effective  in
provLding  the  required  confidence  for  the  exchange  rate  policy.
It is  also  important  to  note  that  the  special  grant  was conditional
on Israel's  implementation  of  a serious  program  which  had  to involve  measures
which  could  potentially  stop  inflation. It is  because  of this  nature  of the
grant  that  it  might  have  tipped  the  scales  in favor  of a  drastic  program.
Thus,  the significance  of the  special  grant  goes  far  beyond  its  dollar  value.- 16 -
Another  factor  which  affected  the  current  account  was the  change  in
U. S.  policy  with respect  to  the  form  of financing  its  military  aid  to  Israel,
whereby  long  term  loans  at an  annual  rate  of 0.9  billion  dollars  (close  to 4
of  GNP in  1985  were replaced  by grants. 9/  Unlike  the  special  grant,  this
represented  a change  of a  permanent  nature  which  stopped  the  growth  of the
public  debt  to the  U.S.  government  which  constituted  the  major  component  of
Israel's  foreign  debt. The  U.S.  decided  on this  move  at the  end  of 1984  and
it  was impl  tented independently  of the  stabilization  program.
Taken  by itself  this  factor  can  account  for  two  thirds  of the
improvement  in the  current  account  GNP  ratio  between  1981  - 1984  and  1987,
which  amounted  to 6  percentage  points  of GNP (see  table  2).  One  obtains  the
same  proportions  by computing  the  improvement  in terms  of  current  dollars. It
is therefore  important  to look  more  thoroughly  into  the  significance  of this
change,  especially  from  the  longer  run  perspective.  As we shall  see  there  are
strong  reasons  to  believe  that  the  importance  of this  factor  has  been
exaggerated.
It  may be  noted  that  Israel's  debt  to the  U.S.  government  cannot  be
regarded  as an ordinary  commercial  debt. In fact,  it  has  been  argued  that  the
U. S.  civilian  (non-defense)  grant  was  used  de facto  to finance  the  debt
service. Indeed,  the  data  in table  4 show  that  the  civilian  grant  adjusted
over  the  years  to the  increased  debt  service  leaving  a small  surplus  of
100-200  million  dollars  annually.
In  view  of this  consideration  it is  useful  to look  simply  at the  net
financial  resource  transfer  through  U.S.  aid (grants  plus  debt  service  minus
new  loans). Alternatively,  one  may look  at the  net  resource  transfer  minus
direct  defense  imports  (considering  these  as tied). Table  5 shows  that  there
has  not  been  any  drastic  change  in  these  flows  in  the  post-stabilization
period  (the  improvement  can  amount  to  at  most lZ  of  GNP).- 17 -
The  foregoing  considerations  may suggest  that  the  relevant  indicator
to look  at for  the  purpose  of the  issue  in  question  is  not  the  current  account
but rather  the,  basic  account,  which is  the  sum  of the  former  and  long  term
capital  imports  (this  corresponds  to a 'balance  of payments,,  which  includes
short  term  capital  flows  and  the  change  in  central  bank's  reserves).  Measured
in  current  dollars  the  basic  account'.  showa  an improvement  in 1987  as
compared  vith 1981-1984  of about  200  million  dollars,  which  can  be contrasted
with an improvement  of  about  1.2  billion  dollars  in the  current  account.
Thus,  from  the  point  of  view  of the  basic  account  there  has  not occurred  any
fundamental  change  in  the  external  position.
Indeed,  if it is  true  that  the  improvement  in  the  current  account  is
due  mainly  to the  switch  to grants  then  it is  an indirect  piece  of  evidence
that  this  change  did  not  increase  the  economy's  permanent  income. Otherwise
the  change  would  increase  total  (private  plus  public)  consumption  so  as to
offset  most of the  effect  of the  increased  grants  on  the  current  account.
The  foregoing  discussion  is  not  meant  to  claim  that  the  switch  to
grants  was  not significant  at  all.  Surely  it  reduced  the  uncertainty
concerning  the  continuation  of  the  U.S.  accommodative  policy  to  the  growing
debt  service  and  presumably  had  a favorable  effect  on the  attitude  of the
financial  markets  to Israel's  borrowing  possibilities.
The  foregoing  analysis  seems  to suggest  that  the  switch  to grants  had
a greater  effect  on Israel's  liquidity  position  than  on its  permanent  income
(assummdng  that  the  increased  debt  service  was to  be  financed  by additional
grants).  Indeed,  if  we look  at the  basic  account  in  table  1 we see  that
Israel  was  not in  any  fundamental  difficulties  in  its  balance  of payments
before  the  stabillzation.  It seems  that  it  was  mainly  the  cyclic
deterLorations  in  the  balance  of  payments,  and  the  policy  reaction  to them,
that  led  to  the  acceleration  of inflation.- 18  -
6.  Real  Aspects  of Fiscal  Policy
The  basic  facts  concerning  the  cut  in  the  domestic  fiscal  deficit
are  summarized  in  table  6.  Comparing  the  stabilization  period  1985-1987  10/
with the  pre-stabilizat_on  period  1980-1984  we find  that  the  fiscal  deficit  of
the  public  sector  (in  the  operational  sense)  was  cut  by 8.6Z  of  GNP  about  half
of  which  are  net  taxes  and  the  rest  is  public  consumption  (public  sector
investment  varied  very little). Comparing  1987  with 1980-1984,  we still  find
that  the  cut  in  the  fiscal  deficit,  112  of  GNP,  is again  divided  roughly  in
half  between  net  taxes  and  public  consumption. 11/
In spite  of the  sharp  decrease  in  d1sposable  income  in 1985,
following  the  tax  hike,  and  regardless  of the  fact  that  disposable  income
regained  its  1984  level  only  in 1987,  private  consumption  did  not  respond  to
this  situation,  but  rather  started  an  upward  surge  which  took  an extreme  form
of a 14?  rise  in 1986  and 7?  in 1987.
The  question  which  arises  in  view  of these  developments  are  the
following:  Why did  not  consumption  respond  to  the  increase  in taxation? Why
did  it in fact  rise  remarkably  when real  disposable  income  remained  depressed
for  three  years? Is there  any  connection  between  the  increase  in  private
consumption  and  the  reduction  in  public  consumption?
It is quite  clear  that  private  consumption  need  not  respond  to the
drop  in  disposable  income  in 1985 (see  table  1) because  this  shock  effect  may
have  been  considered  as temporary. This  is  understandable  in  view  of the  fact
that  most  variations  of  net taxes  in  Israel  were  of a temporary  nature,  being
related  to election  cycles  (as  in  1981  and  1984),  to  unexpected  jumps  in
inflation  which  eroded  temporarily  the  tax  base  as a result  of the  Tanzi
effect  (as  in 1984),  and  so on.  The  reaction  of the  private  sector  to these- 19  -
variations  has  been  by an large  in line  with  the  permanent  income  theory,  or
with the  Richardian  equivalence  approac.. Figure  2 shows  quite  clearly  the
remarkable  negative  correlation  between  public  and  private  saving  over  the
past  15  years.
However,  while  this  type  of reactlon  may  explain  lack  of response  to
the  initial  shock  it  cannot  explain  the  increase  in  consumption,  relative  to
GNP (table  10)  when  disposable  income  continued  to  be depressed. In the
following  discussion  I  wish to  explore  several  theories  which  might  explain
the  apparent  contradiction  between  the  private  consumptlon  boom  and  the
contractionary  fiscal  policy.
a.  One interpretation  centers  on the  assumption  that  people  perceive
the  exchange  rate  stabilization  as  being  temporary,  i.e.  as a  period  of low
inflatLon  to  be followed  by a resumption  of inflation. Suppose  that  ln  this
setting,  modelled  by  Calvo (1987),  consumption  of liquidity  services  and
ordinary  consumption  are  complements  (this  is also  considered  by Obstfeld
(1985). Then  ordinary  consumption  will rise  in  the  stabilization  period  when
consumptlon  of liquidity  services  is  cheap. This factor  operates  regardless
of the  time  path  of fiscal  deficits.
Another  feature  of the (presumed)  temporariness  of stabilization  is
related  to  the  tendency  to increase  the  purchase  of durables,  as  has been
noted  by Dornbusch  (1985). Indeed  one  observes  a large  increase  in  purchase
of durables  in  1986 (table  9).  However  one  should  note that  thls  followed  two
years  of a low  level  of purchases  following  an earlier  boom.  One  should  also
note that  non-durable  consumption  (which  constitutets  about  902  of total
consumption)  rose  by 102  in 1986  and  by 72 in  1987,  which shows  that  the
consumption  boom is  not  confined  to durables.- 20  -
In  the  Calvo  model  the  stabilization  of the  ezchange  rate  should  a1so
raise  the  trade  deficit,  which  was  not  the  case  in Israel  (table  10). This  is
explained,  in  part,  by the  reduction  in  public  consumption  which  matched  the
increase  in  private  consumption  (comparing  1981-94  with 1987,  Table  10).  Thus
fiscal  policy  with respect  to  public  consumption  offset  the  expansionary
effect  generated  by the (presumably)  temporary  exchange  rate  stabilization.
b.  An alternative  interpretation,  which  is referred  to  briefly  in
AR87 chapter  2, takes  an  opposite  view  of expectations.  Thus  suppose  that
people  really  believe  that  stabilization  is  here  to stay  and  they  also  believe
in the  permanence  of the  cut  in  public  consumption.  Assume  further  that
people  use  public  consumption  as an indicator  of their  permanent  level  of  net
taxes. 12/  This  can  be justified  on the  basis  of the  greater  stability  of
public  consumption  relative  to  nut  taxes  (see  table  7).
Now it  may  be assumed  that  people  expected  the  stabilization  to  be
based  on the  elimination  of the  fiscal  deficit. On the  basis  of  past
experience  they  may  have  thought  that  the  balancing  of  the  budget  will  be
achieved  by  a  rise  in  net  taxes.  In  practice,  however,  half  of the  cut  in the
fiscal  deficit  was in the  form  of  a reduction  in  public  consumption.  Since
the  latter  is  an estimate  of permanent  net  taxes  people  found  themselves  with
higher  permanent disposable  income  which  induced  them  to increase  their
consumption,  in  spite  of the  fact  that  their  measured  disposable  income  went
down. To put it  differently,  permanent  disposable  income  went up  because  the
increase  in  taxes  was less  than  expected. It should  be  noted  thr.t  this  theory
explains  not  only  the  emergency  of the  consumption  boom  but  also  its
magnitude,  which  should  be  roughly  equal  to  the  decline  in  public  consumption.- 21 -
According  to this  interpretation  the  reduction  in  public  consumption
appears  to  be the  cause  of the  consumption  boom  so that  on the  whole  fiscal
policy  was  neutral  with respect  to the  import  surplus.
What  was then,  in retrospect  the  benefit  of  cutting  the  fiscal
deficit  through  public  consumption  instead  of  making  the  full  adjustment
through  taxation? One  of the  advantages  in  making  the  adjustment  through
public  consumption  is that  in  a  world  of  uncertainty  the  latter  form  is  a  more
credible  way of convincing  the  public  of the  permanence  of the  fiscal
adjustment,  which  has favorable  effects  on the  financial  position  of the
economy.
Secondly,  unlike  the  model  of Ricardian  equivalence,  taxes  are
distortionary.  This  is  especially  the  case  in  Israel  whose  gross  tax  rate  is
among  the  highest  in the  world. Raising  taxes  still  more is  most undesirable.
Thirdly,  the  cut  in the  relative  size  of the  public  sector  made it possible  to
divert  the  entire  increment  to the  labor  force  to the (nonfinancial)  business
sector,  thus  contributing  to a  more  desirable  form  of  growth.
c.  An additional  interpretation  can  be given  on the  basis  of the
distributional  aspect  of stabilization.  AR 87 points  out  that  the
stabilization  program  brought  about  a sharp  increase  in  net (disposable)  wage
rates  in  1986-87. This  was so  because  the  gross  real  wage rate  increased
sharply  in  these  years (especially  in 1986)  while  the  rates  of direct  taxation
on labor  income  actually  fell  [this  was  offset  by a sharp  increase  in  the
taxation  of non-wage  incomes  in 1986.  (See  AR87 ch.  5)]. The  dominant  factor
mas however,  by far,  the increase  in  gross  wages.
Table  8 shows  that  the  decline  in  the  net  wage  rate (per  employee
post)  was  mild in  1985  and  the  increase  was sharp  in  1986  compared  with total
disposable  income  (table  1).  Assuming  that  the  marginal  propensity- 22  -
to consume  out  of  wage income  is  higher  we obtain  a  possible  explanation  of
the  consumption  boom.  Iu fact  table  8 shows  that  net  wages  and  consumption
were quite  closely  correlated  in the  1980's.  13/
According  to this  interpretation  the  change  in  the  income
distribution  in  favor  of labor  outweighed  the  effect  of a reduction  in total
disposable  income  as far  as private  consumption  is  concerned. However,  was
the  increase  in  gross  wages  (whlich  wac the  dominant  features  of  this  process)
an independent  factor  or  was it  due  to  demand  pressures  generated  by the
exchange  rate  stabilization?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  not  quite  clear
(we  shall  return  to this  issue  later).
d.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  the  greater  sense  of security  which
came  with stabilization  tended  to increase  private  consumption.  But,  as is
well  known,  the  effect  of  uncertainty  (as  is  the  effect  of the  interest  rate)
on consumption  is  ambiguous.
I  would  suggest  that  the  different  interpretations  given  above  should
not  be considered  as  mutually  exclusive. Thus  it  might  well  be the  case  that
in the  early  phase  of stabilization  the  public  was  much  more skeptical  and
behaved  according  to the  Calvo  model  and  then,  as the  program  gained  more
credibility,  the  more  optimistic  interpretation  took  over.  To  the  extent  that
wage  pushes  were important  they  can  be added  to the  other  interpretations.
7.  Financial  Aspects  of the  Fiscal  Adjustment
The  foregoing  discussion  suggested  the  possibility  that  the  fiscal
adjustment  did  not  have  an appreciable  effect  on Lotal  domestic  demand  and
consequently  did  not  affect  the  import  surplus. However,  the  elimination  of
the  domestic  fiscal  deficit  had  a  most  sinpificant  effect  on  the  financial
markets  by restoring  the  confidence  in the  government's  ability  to service  the_ 23 -
debt. This  renewed  confidence  reduced  the  threat  to  the  reserves  of the
central  bank  and  provided  a firm  support  for  the  fixed  exchange  rate  policy.
One indicator  of this  transformation  is in  the  composition  of deficit
finance  (see  table  3).  Prior  to stabilization  the  proportion  of foreign
exchange  sales  increased  rapidly  till  it reached  8.62  of GNP  in 1984  (this
accounted  for  two  thirds  of the  deficit  compared  with  one  quarter  in 1982)
However,  after  stabilization  these  net  sales  fell  gradually  to  zero.
Another  indicator  is  the  behavior  of the  derived  capital  import  of
the  private  sector,  which  measures  the  excess  of the  current  account  over  the
sales  of foreign  exchange  to the  private  sector. This  measure  indicates  that
the  capital  exports,  ^.ich  characterized  1984  and  the  first  half of  1985
turned  into  capital  imports  from  the  second  half  of 1985  (see  table  12).
Similarly  werrors  and  missions"  of the  private  sector  indicate  an
intensification  of  capital  flight  in  1983  through  the  first  half  of 1985,  a
process  which  stopped  abruptly  in the  second  half  of 1985  and  did  not reappear
since.
The  foregoing  discussion  suggests  that  the  main role  of the  fiscal
adjustment  was in  its  effect  on  the  financial  markets  rather  than  on  the  trade
account.
8.  Domestic  Investment  and  Monetary  Policy
The  offsetting  effects  of private  and  government  consumption  imply
that  national  saving  out  of  GNP  was  not  affected  in  any  significant  manner  by
the  stabilization  program. This  means  that  the  improvement  in the  trade
account  was related  almost  entirely  to  the  reduction  in the  investmentIGNP
ratio. One  can  see  in  table  10  that  the  improvemcnt  in the  trade  account/GNP
ratio  matches  the  reduction  in  the  investment  /GNP  ratio.- 24  -
The  fall  in  investment  cannot  be  considered  as an autonomous
development.  The  decline  in  investment  in ,ixed  assets  began  in  1984  and  it
was  part  of a  policy  of improving  the  trade  balance  in  the  wake of the  crisis
which  followed  the  abandonment  of the  policy  of slowing  down  the  rate  of
devaluation  in 1983. This  was accomplished  by tightening  monetary  policy
which  led  to an increase  in  the  real  interest  rate  (see  table  1)  and  to  an
improvement  in the  trade  account.
The  tighter  monetary  policy  following  the  initiation  of the
stabilization  program  in 1985  raised  short-term  interest  rates  on free  credit
to the  domestic  market  even  more.  This  policy  discriminated  against  finance
of domestic  activity  since  interest  rates  on loans  to  exporters  were  not
affected  appreciably.  In  particular,  this  policy  hit  hard  construction
activity  where  the  interest  component  in  costs  is  relatively  higher. Thus  in
1985  and  1986  investment  in residential  construction  dropped  12  and  8  percent
respectively  in real  terms  (AR87,  p. 31). Since  construction  accounts  for
more than  40Z  of total  gross  investment  we may infer  that  tight  monetary
policy  played  a significant  role  in  cutting  investment.
In 1987  there  was  a recovery  of domestic  investment  following  the
surge  in  economic  activity  but  the  level  still  remained  below  normal. Real
interest  rates  on credit  lines  to the  domestic  market  still  remained  very  high
(about  2.5Z  per  month). Although  these  high  rates  on loans,  which  exceed  by
far  the  deposit  rates,  are  considered  excessive  by the  Bank  of Israel,  yet  the
fact  remains  that  they  hamper  construction  activities  and  perhaps  other  forms
of investment  as  well.
Since  the  ratio  of capital  to output  has  been falling  in the  past
three  years  and  since  real  interest  rates  are  expected  to fall  in the  future
one  may expect  a recovery  of investment  in the  years  ahead  with a  possible- 25 -
negative  effect  on  the  trade  balance. However,  with improved  confidence  in
the  economy  this  need  not  create  difficulties  since  higher  investment  will
contribute  eventually  to future  output  and  exports.
9.  Summing  Up the  Influences  on  the  Exte)nal  Position
Table  10 sums  up the  changes  in the  import-surplus,  following
stabilization,  in  terms  of domestic  uses. When  we compare  1987  with the
1981-1984  average,  in terms  of current  ratios  to  GNP,  we find  that  private  and
public  consumption  roughly  offset  each  other,  with  the  changes  being  in  the
order  of 5.5t  of GNP. This  means  that  the  improvement  in  the  trade  account  by
about  3.5Z  of  GNP is "explained*  mainly  by the  cut  in  investment.
The  foregoing  comparisons  which  are  based  on ratios  of  various
variables  to  GNP,  measured  in  current  prices,  may  be problematic  when the
exchange  rate  is  considered  as overvalued  (as  might  be the  case  in 1987  as a
result  of the  fixed  exchange  rate  policy). In this  case  the  import  surplus
will  be downward  biased. In order  to check  this  point  we carried  out  the  same
comparisons  using  constant  price  variables  as computed  by the  Central  Bureau
of Statistics.  The  results  are  suzmmarized  in  table  11.  They  show  essentially
the  same  picture  as the  current  price  ratios  and  therefore  do  not require
additional  comment.
According  to one  of the  earlier  interpretation  the  reduction  in
public  consumption  generated  an increase  in  private  consumption  which  offset
the  effect  of the  former  on the  trade  account. The  improvement  in the  trade
account  is then  attributable  mainly  to  the  tight  monetary  policy  which  brought
about  a reduction  in  the  investment/GNP  ratio. Therefore  this  improvement
cannot  be considered  as being  due  to fundamental  changes.- 26 -
Indeed,  the  most significant  change  in  the  external  position  was  of
financial  rather  than  of a *real"  nature  (meaning  the  trade  account  and
related  measures). This  was the  elimination  of the  constant  injection  of
liquidity  through  the  large  fiscal  deficits  which  threatened  to lead  to
recurrent  financial  crises,  especially  in the  foreign  exchange  markets.
If the  changes  in the  current  account  were  not  fundamental,  does  it
mean that  the  present  state  of  affairs  is  not  sustainable?  Not  necessarily.
First,  as  we noted  earlier,  it is  not  quite  clear  that  the  state  of the
balance  of payments  in  the  pre-stabilization  era  was  not sustainable.
Secondly,  even  if a fundamental  improvement  was indeed  required  it  may  still
take  place  in  the  future  with the  stimulus  of growth  provided  by a stabilized
economy  and  by the  benefits  of reforms  in  the  tax  structure  and  in the  capital
markets.
III. Evolution  of Policies  in the  Course  of Stabilization  14/
1.  Fiscal  Policy
Since  the  beginning  of the  stabilization  program  till  the  end  of 1987
the  government  maintained  consistently  a  virtually  balance  budget  with
domestic  deficit  running  at about  1Z  of  GNP.  The  persistent  behavior  was
maintained  both  with respect  to direct  domestic  public  sector  demands  and  net
taxes. However  since  the  last  quarter  of 1987  through  the  second  quarter  of
1988  there  are  indications  that  the  public  sector  deficit  is increasing.  This
is  based  on estimates  of the  central  government's  domestic  deficit,  calculated
on  a cash  basis  from  the  Bank  of Israel  accounts. According  to these
estimates  the  domestic  deficit  in the  last  three  quarters  (including  real
interest  payment  on the  public  debt)  was around  4Z of  GNP. While  this- 27 -
reflects,  probably,  the temporary  stresses  due to the  oncoming  elections  it
may exert  a destabilizing  influence  on the  delicate  balance  achieved  by the
program.
We have  mentioned  earlier  that in  1987  there  was a change  in  taxation
policy  with the introduction  of the reform  in direct  taxes  (see  footnote  6).
Taken  by itself  this  would have reduced  the  government  revenues  by 3S of  GNP
(AR87  estimate). However.  the increased  efficiency  in tax  collection  due to
the low inflation  (the  Tanzi  effect  in reverse)  offset  the  foregoing  tendency
so  that  the share  of  net taxation  in  GNP remained  unchanged.
2.  Monetary  Policy
The spite  of the  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  the government  used
monetary  policy in  an active  manner throughout  the  program.  This  was made
possible  by the  tight  controls  on capital  flows. At the  beginning,  monetary
policy  contained  domestic  activity  and  discouraged  capital  flight  through  very
high real  interest  rates  for  loans  to the  domestic  market (even  if  we assume
high  values for inflationary  expectations). Figure  3 shows  the significant
spread  between  domestic  and foreign  interest  rates  (adjusted  for  devaluation)
which existed  since  nominal  interest  rates  stabilized  in the first  half of
1986.  It can  be seen  that  this spread  remained  constant  even  when the  black
market  premium fell  significantly.
One of the  manifestations  of the  central  bank's  active  stance  was the
tight  monetary  policy  implemented  in  the  beginning  of 1987 in  order  to prevent
an acceleration  of inflation  following  the  January  devaluattLA. This  exercise
raised  domestic  interest  rates (figure  3)  and induced  large  capital  inflows,
in spite  of controls,  which reversed  themselves  later  in the  year  when
expectations  of devaluation  were revived. Thus  although  capital  flows  limited
the  possibility  of conducting  monetary  policy,  yet the  controls  on these  flows
left  enough  room  to use the  policy  quite  effectively.- 2b  -
In the  course  of  the  program  there  was a shift  from  using  commercial
bank  credit  as  an intermediate  target  to  a  wider  concept  - net domestic  credit
(NDC). This  shift  seems  justified  in  a fixed  exchange  rate  regime  where  the
focus  is  on foreign  exchange  reserves.  With  NDC  being  defined  so  as to
satisfy  the  equation:
Honey  - NDC  +  reserves
one  may regard  the  targetirg  of NDC,  given Money',  as targeting  reserves.
The  concept  of  money  chosen  for  this  purpose  is  M3 which  includes  H2
plus  deposits  linked  to foreign  exchange  (PATAM),  15/  the  reason  being  that
the  demand  for  M3 is  more stable  than  for  M1 or  M2 (see  table  2).  As a result
of  this  targeting  real  bank  credit  was  allowed  to  grow  16/  fast  while
real  M3 growth  was restricted.  In fact  M3 relative  to  nominal  GNP  declined
slightly  between  1986  and  1987 (see  table  2).  While  this  policy  indicates  an
effort  to  keep reserves  from  falling  it  does  represent  at the  same  time  an
accommodating  monetary  policy  towards  inflation  which  continued  at a rate  of
202  per  annum. We may infer  therefore  that  the  basic  nominal  anchor  was  the
exchange  rate;  monetary  policy  provided  indirect  support  for  this  anchor  by
guarding  foreign  exchange  reserves  but  not  directly  by setting  nominal  targets
of  NDC  or for  money.
2.  Exchan8e  Rate  Polic,
In the  first  stage  of stabilization  the  exchange  rate  was  pegged  to
the  U.S.  dollar  in an act  which  symbolized  the  new era  of stability.  Once  the
weakening  of the  dollar  became  an  anticipated  phenomenon  this  policy  was
Implicitly  one  of planned  devaluation  at a slow  rate,  which  amounted  to  a
devaluation  of 162  with respect  to the  basket  of currencies  in  the  first  year
of the  program.  17,- 29 -
Since  August  1986  the  exchange  rate  was  pegged  to the  basket  of
currencies  and  since  then  it  was  devalued  by 1O  in  January  1987  and  by  about
3.5Z  till  the  first  quarter  of 1988. On the  whole,  since  the  third  quarter  of
1985  till  the  first  quarter  of 1988  the  exchange  rate  of the  basket  was
devalued  by 352  while  the  consumers  price  index  rose  by 56Z.  Since  it is
unlikely  that  this  difference  will  be allowed  to  widen  or even  to  persist  one
may infer  that  the  emerging  exchange  rate  policy  is  one  of long  steps  (many
people  expect  the  next devaluation  within  the  framework  of some  agreement  to
sterilize,  at  least  partially,  its  effect  in  the  cola.
The  authorities  clearly  rejected  the  policy  of a crawling  peg  based
on  mini-devaluations.  This  is  motivated  by the  objection  to legitimize  the
crawling  inflation  and  also  by the  desire  not  to commit  oneself  to  any  rate  of
inflation  before  the  post-stabilizatIon  conditions  become  clearer. A  floating
exchange  rate  is  unthinkable  in  the  present  situation  because  the  economy  is
still  highly  indexed  and  therefore  very  susceptible  to  nJminal  shocks  and
secondly  because  under  the  latter  regime  it is  more  difficult  to reach  an
understanding  with  labor  about  wage  policy.
IV.  Policy  Dilemmas
1.  The  Low Inflation  Step
In  the  early  stages  of  the  stabilization  program,  when inflation  fell
to  1  5-2  percent  per  month  it  was  thought  that  this  is  a  temporary  phase.
However,  as  time  passed  and  inflation  showed  no  sign  of  falling  further  it
became  clearer  that  economy  is  on  some  low  inflation  step  of  about  20S
annually  (see  table  13).  What  could  be  the  reason  for  having  an  inflation  in
excess  of the  industrialized  countries  when  the  budget  was balanced  and  the
central  bank  had ample  reserves?-30-
The  theory  of inertia  due  to staggered  prices  does  not seem  to be an
appropriate  expianation  since  in this  case  we should  observe  a  declining  trend
for  inflation. Similarly,  the  wage  price  spiral  due  to lagged  indexation
adjustment  was  neutralized  by the  controls  and  the  package  deal  at the
beginning  of  the  progeam.
One  of  the  explanations  offered  for  this  phenomenon  was  the  exchange
rate  policy  followed  in the  first  year. As  noted  earlier,  by pegging  the
exchange  rate  to  the  dollar  when  the  latter  was  weakening,  the
shekeldepreciated  relative  to  the  basket  of  currencies  by  162  in  the  first
year.  17/  This  may  have  out  the  economy  into  an  expectational  orbit  of about
202  inflation.
Why did  the  authorities  not  peg  the  shekel  to the  basket  of
currencies  Luediately  when it  became  known  that  the  dollar  was likely  to
continue  weakening?  It is  argued  that  maintaining  a fixed  exchange  rate  with
respect  to the  basket  would  imply  an  absolute  reduction  in the  exchange  rate
of the  dollar. This  would  require  an absolute  reduction  in  the  prices  of
exports  to the  dollar  area.  If  wages  and  prices  of inputs  exhibit  downward
rigidity  then  this  may  entail  unemployment  (See  Bruno  and  Piterman  (1987)).
However,  this  argument  still  does  not  explain  why prices,  in  a  post-
stabilization  environment,  should  exhibit  greater  rigidity  than  in  the
industrialized  countries,  which  somehow  overcame  these  difficulties.
An alternative  explanation  for  the  low  inflation  step  is that  people
do  not  expect  the  government  to fight  in  order  to reduce  further  what  appears
to  be a low  Inflation  level  after  the  big achievement  of reducing  inflation
from  a high level  to the  present  one.  Therefore  they  expect  the  government  to
accommodate  wage  and  price  Increases  which  do  not  exceed  critical  level.  One
cannot  explain  why the  critical  level  is  around  202  per  year  but  one  may- 31 -
mention  that  a low  inflation  step  of this  order  of  magnitude  has  been  observed
in  other  successful  stabilizations  in  chronic  inflation  countries  (as  was the
case  following  the  1964  stabilization  in  Brazil,  or in  Chile  in  the  1980's).
In support  of this  argument  we  may  note that  the  only  method  which
seems  to  have  worked  so  far  in reducing  inflation  in  a susta'nable  manner  was
neither  monetary  nor  exchange  rate  policy  but  rather  the  heterodox  shock  of
July  1985. However,  one  cannot  expect  realistically  that  the  government  can
mobilize  the  political  power  to repeat  the  same  steps  to subdue  a low
inflation,  which  by itself  is  considered  as a  big  victory. Moreover,  the  very
fact  that  the  government  used  controls  and  package  deals  to  avoid  unemployment
when it  reduced  inflation  undermined  its  credibility  to accept  a recession  as
part  of its  disinflationary  effort,  which  reduces  the  effectiveness  of
monetary  policy. In  view of these  considerations  the  public  expects  the
government  to accommodate  moderate  wage  and  price  increases,  which  puts  the
goverment in a  difficult  dilemma.
The  danger  in  accomuodating  the  low  inflation  step  is  that  the
process  of  maintaining  domestic  inflation  above  the  world  level  for  a long
time  to likely  to  be unstable. It is  difficult  to reduce  the  degree  of  wage
indexation  when it is  known  that  the  economy  faces  recurrent  jumps  in the
exchange  rate (with  uncertain  timing). So the  system  remains  susceptible  to
other  big  nominal  shocks  which  are  bound  to  come  sooner  or  later  and  rock  the
low  inflation  step.  On the  other  hand,  a  non-accomodative  policy  may  imply  a
period  of  unemployment  which  is  not  acceptable  politically.  It  seems
therefore  that  the  dilemma  of  the  low  inflation  step  is  some  form  of  the  olf
trade-off  between  inflation  and  unemployment.  In  orthodox  stabilitation
(using  a  monetary  crunch)  this  issue  appears  immediately  while  in  a  heterodox
stabilization  it  emerges  at a later  stage.- 32 -
2.  The  Issue  of Real  ADpreciation
One  of the  disturbing  features  of the  stabilization  program  is  the
continuing  real  appreciation,  amounting  to 15?  between  1985  and  1987 (see
table  1).  This  is generally  a feature  of exchange  rate  based  stabilizations
which  are  heading  towards  a  crash. However,  ordinarily  the  real  appreciation
is  associated  with  a sharp  rise  in the  import  surplus  which  is  not  quite  the
case  in  Israel.
In the  course  of the  stabilization  program  the  import  surplus  as
percent  of GNP (in  current  prices)  rose  by 1.5  percentage  points  in 1986  and
by 12 in  1987). This  does  indicate  a worsening  of the  import  surplus  but  not
at  an alarming  rate. We also  recall  that  the  level  of  the  import  surplus  in
1987  was still  far  below  the  pre-stabilization  period.
We  may look  alternatively  at a comparison  based  on quantity  measurep
of domestic  uses  and  of GNP (the  indifference  between  these  being  the  import 1
surplus). These  indicators  show  that  while  in  1986  the  growth  of domestic
uses  exceeded  GNP  by 5,  the  excess  dropped  to 0.52  in  1987.  This  difference
and some  additional  considerations  suggest  that  we should  deal  separately  with
1986  and  1987  (extending  into  1988).
One  of the  accepted  interpretations  of the  fast  rate  of real
appreciation  in 1986  is  the  foregoing  growth  in domestic  demands  which
presumably  originated  from  the  greater  sense  of security  which  followed  the
success  of the  program  in its  initial  phase.  (An  alternative  interpretation
could  be provided  by the  Obstfeld-Calvo  approach). This  is the  demand  pull
interpretation  of the  real  appreciation  in  1986.- 33 -
It  has  been  pointed  out,  however,  that  the  increase  in  demands  in
1986  followed  a  year  of  most  depressed  domestic  demand  (see  table  10).
Comparing  the  quantity  levels  of domestic  uses (relative  to  GNP) in  1986  with
earlier  years  we find  that  the  level  of domestic  demands  in the  latter  year
was about  the  same  as in 1984  and  much  lover  than  in 1983  while  relative
prices  of exports  and  imports  were  much  lower  in 1986. These  facts  suggest
that  the  real  appreciation  in  1986  may  be  due  to cost  pushes  from  the  labor
market  after  the  relaxation  of  wage  controls. 18/  This  view  is supported  by
the  sharp  rise  ln labor  costs  in  1986  and  by the  fact  that  unemployment  was
higher  than  in 1983  and  1984 (see  table  1).
The  demand-side  view  of the  real  appreciation  in  1986  does  not
explain  much  about  the  continued  real  appreciation  in 1987  because  the  growth
1*  latter  year  was balanced.  19,  The  wage  push  theory  is  also  problematic
because  lt  does  not  seem  to  be consistent  with  the  remarkable  growth  of output
in  the  business  sector  and  the  drop  in  unemployment.  The  upshot  of the
foregoing  discussion  is  that  it  is difficult  to  explain  the  behavlor  of the
real  exchange  rates  or  the  real  wage  in  the  post-stabilization  period  by  means
of  the  balance  between  domestic  uses  and  GNP. Explanations  based  on cost  push
considerations  are  not  particularly  illui-nAting  either  in  vlew  of  the
accelerated  growth  in  1987.
An alternative  approach  to the  issue  of real  appreciation  could  be
based  on the  idea  that  stabilization  has  brought  about  a structural  change  in
the  financial  and  productive  spheres  which  changed  the  equilibrium  real
exchange  rate. For  example,  the  improved  liquidity  position  of the  economy
may  have  reduced  precautionary  demand  for  foreign  exchange  by  the  private
sector.  Given  the  restrictions  on capital  flows  this  may  have  cause  a real
appreciation.  A  similar  conclusion  can  Le  obtained  if  the  reduction  in- 34 -
uncertainty  had  a relatively  larger  impact  on  productivity  in the  sector  of
tradeables.  The  reduction  in  government's  domestic  purchases  of tradeables
may  have  worked  in  the  same  direction.  However,  the  verification  of these
hypotheses  requires  detailed  research.
If the  real  appreciation  was  in fact  due  to structural  changes  then
it  need  not  be a cause  of concern. There  are  however  reasons  to  believe  that.
part  of  the  real  appreciation  can  be attributed  to  unduly  strong  attachment  to
the  fixed  exchange  rate  policy  in  face  of inflationary  expectations  of the
type  described  in  the  proceeding  section.
In order  to clarify  this  point  we may suppose  that  in the  course  of
1986,  and  especially  since  the  pegging  of the  exchange  to the  basket  of
currencies  in  August,  people  were  expecting  a  corrective  devaluation  at some
uncertain  (but  not  very  distant)  date. 20/  The  actual  devaluation  (of  1OZ)
took  place  in  January  1987. Therefore  the  expected  labor  costs  in 1986  were
lower  (especially  in  the  second  half)  than  the  observed  ones  and  the  opposite
is  trust  of the  real  exchange  rate. Therefore  the  data  exaggerate  the  real
appreciation  in  1986. The  correction  in real  wages  and  relative  prices
brought  about  by the  devaluation  can  be seen  in  table  14.
The  same  consideration  continued  to  work  even  more forcibly  in 1987
because  then  the  exchange  rate  was  practically  fixed  with respect  to the
currency  basket  while  domestic  inflation  continued  unabated. This  led  to  a
rise  in real  wages  and  drop  in relative  prices  of  exports  and imports  during
the  year  following  the  devaluation  in  the  beginning  of 1988  nor  after  that
till  this  day (July  1988).
According  to  this  view  there  is really  no contradiction  between  the
balance  growth  in  1987  the  real  appreciation  because  the  expected  real
exchange  rate  may  have  remained  constant. Indeed,  as figure  1 shows,  the- 35  -
black  dollar  premium  rose  continuously  after  the  devaluation  in the  beginning
of the  year till  many  people  began  to believe  that  devaluation  will  be
postponed  (perhaps  till  after  the  November  elections).
While  in  the  January  87 devaluation  the  workers  accepted  a
(temporary)  cut  in  real  wages  it seems  that  it  was  not  possible  to repeat  the
same  agreement  in  the  beginning  of 1988  because  of the  approaching  general
elections. Hence  employers  realized  that  real  wages are indeed  higher  than
previously  expected  and  the  opposite  was true  for  the  real  exchange  rate.
The  realization  that  real  wages  may stay  at  a  high  level  for  some  time  may
explain  the  recessionary  tendencies  in  the  economy  in the  second  quarter  of
1988.  21,
The foregoing  analysis  brings  out  a  weakness  of  the  present  regime  of
,agreed  devaluations'  - namely  that  their  implementation  is  restricted  by the
political  conditions  regardless  of the  economic  necessity. The  dilsmma  is
that  returning  to one  sides  devaluations  when  the  economy  is  still  highly
indexed  may  bring  back  the  old  wage-exchange  rate  spiral.  The way  in  which
this  dilemma  will  be  solved  is  one  of  the  key  issues  for  the  continuation  of
disinflation.- 36 -
FOOTNOTES
See  Bruno  (1986)  and  Liviatan  (1986a)
2  The  spread  with  respect  to  nominal  (ex  post)  dollar  linked  loans  for
domestic  activity  was considerably  smaller. The latter  interest  rate
remained  about  1-1.5  percentage  points  above  inflation  in  monthly  terms.
Even  this  represents  a large  spread,  especially  if  we take  into  account
that  the  expected  nominal  rate  on  these  loans  exceeded  the  actual  one
because  the  same  thing  applies  to  devaluation  (especially  in  1987).
S  Interest  rates  on loans  to  exporters  were  kept  close  to international
levels.
4  In additional,  the  degree  (percentage  of  compensation)  of  wage
indexation  was reduced  from  80Z  to  a range  between  70-80S  depending  on
the  time  which  elapsed  between  consecutive  COLA  payments.
5  We shall  use  this  notation  for  Bank  of Israel  Annual  Report  1987
(Hebrew),  with similar  notation  for  other  years.
6  Within  the  framework  of the  tax  reform  the  income  tax  rate  on
undistributed  corporate  profits  was reduced  from  61 to  45 percent. As
for  personal  income  tax,  the  two  highest  steps  of the  tax  rates  - 50  and
60  percent  - were abolished,  with the  maximum  rate  being  reduced  to  48S
(however  a  temporary  surcharge  was imposed  on the  latter  bracket  which
raised  it  to 532  till  December  1987).
7  One form  of compensation  for  the  workers  was the  government's  obligation
to freeze  prices  of a number  of 'basLce  commodities  till  April  1988.
The  base  of  13 consists  of the  money  base (base  of 42)  plus  the  reserve
requirements  of the  private  banks  (deposited  in the  Bank  of Israel)
against  foreign  exchange  linked  deposits  of the  private  sector. Since
the  latter  require  a  1002  backing  of reserves  (again  in the  form  of
foreign  exchange  linked  deposits),  the  shift  towards  non-linked  deposits
following  disinflation,  created  excess  reserves  which  were  partly
sterllized  by  raising  reserve  requirement  on shekel  deposits.
9  Total  U.S.  government  aid  to Israel  in  1984  was about  three  billion
dollars  which  consisted  of  1.8  billion  in  military  aid  (half  of  which
was  a  grant)  and  1.2  billion  dollars  as  a  *civilian  (non-defense
grant).  Note  that  the  change  from  loans  to  grants  does  not  affect  the
net  resource  transfer  in  the  short  run  and  therefore  should  not  be
reflected  in  the  changes  in  the  foreign  exchange  reserves.
10  Strictly,  the  stabilization  period  began  in  July  1985  but  in fact  a
partial  fiscal  adjustment  took  place  in  the  first  half  of  this  year.
11  Two other  facts  about  the  fiscal  adjustment  are  worth  noting.  Comparing
1985-87  with  1980-84  in  terms  of  average  ratios  of  GNP we  find  that- 37 -
domestic  defense  expenditureds  dedcreased  by 2.6  percentage  points  of
GNP  while  civilian  public  consumption  wys reduced  by 1.5  percent  of  GNP.
Thus  most of the  cut  in  public  consumption  did  not compete  directly  with
private  consumption.  On the  revenue  side,  net  direct  taxes,  as S  GNP,
were  not affected  by stabilization  so that  the  entire  increase  in  net
taxes  took  place  in  indirect  taxes.
12  Whien the  government's  budget  4s,  intertemporaly  balanced  w  tG  ;tT  -b
,her;  G  anatT  are  the  permanent  flows  (proper  weighted  averages)  of
government  consumption  and  taxes  as seen  at time  t,tb  is the  stock  of
the  public  debt  at t and  r  is the  interest-rate.  Permanent  disposable  in-
come  is then  given  b  tY  :tG  tY  :  tT  +  Eb where  Y is  permanent  national
income.
13  It should  be pointed  out  however  that  the  variations  in  1981  and  1983  in  both
variables  were related  to direct  policies  of slowing  down inflation.
14  On these  issues  in  the  first  two  years  see  Bruno  and  Piterman  (1986).
15  This implies  that  NDC in  the  sum  of  net  domestic  credit  to the  government  and
to  the  private  sector  provlded  by the  Central  Bank  and  the  private  banking
system.
16  The growth  in domestic  bank  credit  was  offset  by a contraction  of net-domestic
credit  to the  government.  Thus  the  government  continued  to  borrow  from  the
public  for  non-fiscal  reasons  (the  justification  for  this  policy  is  not  clear.
17  Comparing  their  quarters  of  1986  and  1985.
18  One  of  the  manifestations  of  the  wage  push  were  the  lxge  increases  in  the
minimum wage,  which  continued  at  a  slower  pace  in  1987.
19  In  the  sense  that  domestic  uses  increased  in  the  same  proportion  as  GDP (in
constant  prices).
20  It  is  the  variation  in  expectations  about  the  timing  of devaluation  which  may
cause  inexplicable  movements  of the  black  dollar  premium.
21  Part  of the  recessionary  tendency  may  perhaps  be attributed  to  the  consequences
of the  political  unrest  In  Israel's  occupied  territories.- 38 -
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Table  1
Economic  Indicator  1981  - 1987
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
annual  change  (S)  in real  terms
I.  Demands,  Outputs  and
the  Labor  Markets
1.  Real  disposable  income 14.2  -2.6  2.8  8.7  -11.1  2.8  7.3
2.  Private  consumption  12.0  7.7  8.3  -6.8  0.5  14.2  8.1
3.  Public  consumption,  (excl.
defense  imports)  1.4  2.9  2.2  1.5  -1.0  -3.5  1.8
4.  Gross  investment  in
fixed  assets  3.7  5.1  12.6  -11.3  -7.8  -1.6  13.7
5.  Gross  domestic  product
(GDP)  3.8  1.0  2.6  2.4  3.7  3.3  5.2
6.  Total  domestic  uses
(Const.  prices  excl.
defense  imports)  6.5  7.2  7.0  -4.7  -2.2  8.4  5.8
7.  GDP  business  sector  4.7  0.0  3.1  2.8  5.0  5.3  6.9
8.  Total  productivity
(business  sector)  3.0  -1.0  -0.1  -0.3  4.1  3.0  3.4
9.  Real  Wage  rate  11.1  -0.9  4.7  -2.5  -6.8  11.6  8.2
10.  Real labor  cost  per
unit  of output
(business  sector)  -1.6  6.8  5.4  -5.6  0.7  8.4  3.0
------------------------------------------------------
11.  Unemployment  rate  5.1  5.0  4.5  5.9  6.7  7.1  6.1
$ billion,  current  prices
II.  Balance  of Payments
1.  Current  Account  -0.9  -2.0  -2.1  -1.1  -1.1  0.8  -0.3
(0.  3)  (0.0)A
2.  Unilateral  transfer  2.9  2.6  2.9  3.4  5.1  5.4  4.8
3.  Import  surplus
(excl.  defense)  2.1  3.0  3.8  3.3  2.1  2.7  3.4
4.  Basic  account  0.3  -0.8  0.3  -0.4  1.2  1.3  0.1
(0.4)A  (0.5)A
5.  Net  external  debt  13.4  15.6  18.3  19.7  19.3  19.2  19.2
6.  Net international
reserves  3.8  4.3  3.8  3.3  3.8  4.9  6.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------__---
Index  1980  - 100
7.  Relative  price  of
exports  98  93  91  92  92  82  77
8.  Relative  price  of
imports  96  91  85  87  93  83  80- 40 -
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
9.  Terms  of trade  102  107  111  107  107  110  107
III. Prices  and  Interest
Rates  (X)  Monthly  change  (X)
1.  Consumer  price  index  6.0  7.2  9.3  15.2  9.1  1.5  1.3
2.  Wholesale  price  index  6.2  7.5  9.7  15.2  8.0  1.2  1.6
3.  Exchange  Rate (basket
of currencies)  5.6  6.2  9.4  15.7  8.4  0.5  1.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------__---
Monthly  (Z)
4.  Interest  rate  on loans  8.7  7.6  9.0  19.8  15.3  4.0  4.0
5.  Interest  rates  on  N/A  N/A  N/A  14.5  8.4  1.3  1.4
deposition
Sources Bank  of Israel  Annual  Reports  (AR)  and  data  base
of  Research  Department.
1.13  Including  transfers  from  abroad.
1.4: For  economy  as a  whole. Deflated  by  CPI
11.1  Defense  imports  include  always  advances  for  purchases
in  order  to smooth  these  import  data.
II.9: Of exports  nd non  defense  imports  (exc.  capital  services).
111.3:  Bases  on five  currencies.
111.4: Overdraft  facilities  for  domestic  market  activities
(in  domestic  currency).
111.5: CD rate.
^ Excluding special US grant.- 41 -
Table  2
Economic  Indicators  am Z of GNP
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
I.  Fiscal  (public  sector
1.  Domestic  deficit  13.2  10.2  7.3  16.6  7.3  1.4  1.2
2.  Total  deficit  15.4  12.1  7.8  19.0  2.2  -2.8  0.1
3.  Gross  taxes  42.6  45.5  46.1  38.2  451  48.4  47.6
4.  Not  taxes  18.5  24.5  26.2  18.3  27.7  32.4  32.1
5.  Net  ezternal  debt  38'.0  38.0  42.0  50.0  51.0  39.0  34.0
6.  Net  domestic  debt  122.0  125.0  120.0  128.0  138.0  130.0  121.0
11.  Monetary
1.  Hi  3.9  3.4  2.8  1.9  2.3  4.0  5.0
2.  M2  5.7  6.1  6.3  5.4  9.4  13.8  18.6
3.  M3  19.0  19.6  20.7  23.3  25.1  23.4  25.2
4.  Total  bank  credit  23.5  21.6  20.8  23.3  25.1  30.8
5.  Net  domestic  debt  NA  NA  8.7  12.8  16.2  13.4  12.0
TII.  International
1.  Import  9.6  10.9  12.1  9.7  4.5  6.1  7.0
2.  Current  account  -4.0  -8.3  -7.9  -6.8  4.8  2.9  -0.8
(1.7)  (0.4)
3.  Net external  debt  62.0  65.0  76.0  79.0  63.0  53.0
Sources Bank  of Israel  Annual  Report  and  data  base  of
Research  Department
1.1s Based  on real  interest  rates.
1.2:  Domestic  plus  foreign
11.3: M3 - M2 plus  deposits  linked  to foreign  exchange.
11.5: Net  domestic  credit  to private  and  public  sectors,
defined  to satisfy  H3 - net domestic  credit  plus
foreign  exchange  reserves  of  the  Bank  of  Israel.
IIIls:  xzcluding  defense  imports.
Z  Excluding  special  US  grant._ 42  -
Table  3
Domestic  Deficit  oi Public  Sector  and  Its  Financing  (Z  of GNP)
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
whole  2nd
year  half
1.  Domestic  deficit  10.0  6.0  12.3  9.3  6.0  3.9  2.7
Composiiton  of
Deficit  Financings
2.  Change  in  M3 base  2.6  7.6  3.9  0.9  -0.4  -0.5  1.7
2a.  (addition  to the  base
Of  13  1.7  2.3  3.0  6.5  10.6  1.9  2.7
3.  Net increase  in domestic
debt  5.3  -6.3  0.0  4.6  5.3  3.2  3.1
4.  Sale  of foreign  currency  2.6  6.3  8.6  4.8  2.2  2.5  -0.1
S.  Interest  on  monetary  base  -0.6  -1.6  -0.2  -1.1  -1.0  -1.4  -2.0
Source:  AR87,  p. 224
1.  Includes  real  interest  payment  on domestic  debt.
2.  M1 - M2  plus  foreign exchange-linked  deposits.
3.  Includes  also  changes  in the  balance  of  monetary  loan
to  banks (treated  as a  negative  monetary  base.
Table  4
Debt  Service  and  Civilian  Grant
Million  $
1977-  1982-
1981  1984  1985  1986  1987
1.  Debt service  to
U.S. government  495  883  1,055  1,079  1,129
2.  Civilian  grant  625  1,100  1,200  1,200  1,200
3.  (2)  - (1)  130  217  145  121  71
Sources  AR86,  AR87.
(2)  Civilian  grant  excludes  special  U.S.  grant  of  $750  million  in





1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1984  1987
1.  Net Financial
US aid  1,871  1,595  1,805  2,174  2,080  2,391  2,122  1,861  2,198
2.  (1)  minus
dLrect defense
imports  76  57  650  465  198  540  395  312  378
Sourcet  Bank of Israel Annual Reports.
(1)  Excludes special grant of 1985 and 1986.  Referred to in text as 'net Financial
resource transfer* (grants  plus debt service  minus new loans).
Table 6
Public Sector Consumption, Investment, and Net Ta"es,
(Z)  of GNP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
1980-  1985-
1984  1987  (2) - (1)  1987  (4) - (1)
Public consumption
(domestic)  32.2  28.2  -4.1  27.4  -4.9
Public investment  3.2  3.1  -0.1  3.5  0.3
met taxes  23.5  27.9  4.4  29.7  6.2
Domestic deficit  12.0  3.4  -8.6  1.2  -10.9
Sources  AR87, p. 90.
Table 7
Net Taxes and Public Consumption. 1981 - 1984
(1)  of GNP
1981  1982  1983  1984
1.  Hot tazes  18.5  24.5  26.2  18.3
2.  Public consumption  32.4  32.6  31.8  32.7
(diostic)
Sources  AR87, pp. 90, 98._ 44 -
Table  8
Real  Wage  Per  Employee  and  Per  CapLta  ConsumptLoD
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Annual  rate  of change  (Z)
1.  Per  capita
consumption  10.5  5.7  6.1  -8.6  -1.0  12.5  6.3
2.  Real  wage (gross)  11.1  -0.9  4.7  -2.5  -6.8  11.6  8.2
3.  Real  wage (net)  15.2  -2.9  3.1  -6.8  -2.2  13.5  7.7
Sources AR87,  ch.  4.
2. and  3.s  Private  and  public  sector.
Table  9
Durable  and  Won-durable  Consumption
1984  1985  1986  1987
1.  Durable  purchases
as  percent  of total  consumptLon  9.7  8.5  10.6  11.0
2.  Annual  lncrease  (S)  in
constant  prLcest
a.  durable  purchase  -31.5  -0.7  47.1  12.6
b. non-durable  consumptLon  -2.5  0.7  10.2  7.6
Source: A£87,  p. 28
2. is  ln  current  prLces.- 45 -
Table  10
Component.  of GNP in 1981  - 1987
(Z  of GNP (current  prices])
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
1981-
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1984  (7)  - (8)
1. Private
consumption  55.1  56.7  58.2  55.5  57.7  6C.9  61.9  56.4  +5.5
2. Public
consumption
(domestic)  33.2  31.1  30.7  32.1  28.4  26.1  25.9  31.8  -5.9
3. Gross
Investment  21.3  23.1  23.2  22.1  18.4  19.1  19.2  22.4  -3.2
4.  Import
surplus  9.6  10.9  12.1  9.7  4.5  6.1  7.0  10.6  -3.6
5.  Gross  nat. saving
out of GNP  11.7  12.2  11.6  12.4  13.9  13.0  12.2  12.0  0.2
6.  Current
account  -4.0  -8.3  -7.9  -6.8  4.8  2.9  -0.8  -6.8  6.0
7.  Gross  nat. saving
(total)  17.3  14.8  15.3  15.3  13.6  16.2  18.4  15.6  2.8
Calculated  from  data  base of Research  Department  of Bank of Israel
4.  Converted  dollar  values to shekel  by average  official  exchange  rate
for  each  year.  Same  calculation  used  for  nominal  GNP.  Import  surplus
excludes  direct  defense  imports.
Items  (1),  (2)  and  (5)  add  up to  unity.  (1)  +  (2)  +  (3)  - (1)  - (4).  (7)  - (3)  +  (6)
Table  11
Domestic  Uses  as  Percent  of  GNP in  Constant  Prices
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
1981-
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1984  (7)  - (8)
1.  Private
consumption  56.9  60.7  64.1  58.3  56.6  62,5  64.3  60.0  4.3
2.  Public
consumption  30.5  31.1  31.0  30.7  29.3  27.4  26.5  30.8  -4.3
3. Gross
investment  20.5  23.3  25.0  22.7  19.6  20.7  20.4  22.9  -2.5
4. Total  domestic
uses  107.9  115.1  120.1  111.7  105.5  110.6  111.2  113.7  -2.5
Sourcet  Research  Department.  Bank  of Israel,  Data Base.  Line 4 minus  100
yields  the  Import  surplus  (excluding  defense  imports)  in  constant
prices  relative  to  GNP.- 46 -
Table  12
Balance  of  Payments  of  the  Private  Sector,  1981  - 1987
(millions  $)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1985  1986 1987
I  II
1.  Current
account  -434  -1,395  -2,069 -1,442  -217  -51  -268  -769 -940
2.  Basic
account  -489  -1,515  -1,000 -1,269  -254  -40  -294  -616 -609
3.  Errors  and
omnissions  38  40  -1.022  -418  -433  197  -236  231  161




of Israel  380  512  1,588  2,000  677  105  782  659  99
5.  Derived  Capital
import  54  883  480  -558  -460  54  -406  110  840
Sources Years  1981-1984:  AR86,  p. 202;  1985: AR85,  p.225;
1986  - 1987: AR87,  p. 189
The  data  from  the  different  annual  reports  are  not  fully
consistent  with each  other  because  of revisions.
Table  13
Selected  Prices  Indices,  1985-1988,  Quarterly
(annualized  rates  of  change  (Z)  within  period)
1985  1986  1987  1988
I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I
1.  Consumer
price  indez  221  362  247  29  8  30  13  30  19  16  10  19  18
2.  Controlled
pricesga  456  464  416  -2  9  46  13  10  22  14  16  9  13
3.  Industrial
price  index  205  233  203  33  16 22  11  12  32  14  18  20  17
4.  Exchage rate
NIS/currency
basker  241  279  126  14  8  8  5  3  60  -1  0  7  2
Sources AR86,  p. 51 and  AR87,  p.50
a.  The  index  of controlled  prices  comprises  some  'basic'  foodstuffs
and  public  utilities. It  covers  about  26Z  of  CPI.- 47 -
Table  14
Nominal and  Real  Exchange  Rates  1985 - 1988
Schekel  Relative  Relative  Real  Wages
exchange  rate  price  of  price  of  rate  per  unit
atainst  exportgal  imnortsbi  of  outputcl
Dollar  5-curr.
basket
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
I  0.733  0.572  89.1
II  1.015  0.827  83.9
III  1.487  1.273  115  110  75.5
IV  1.481  1.329  113  107  80.0
1986
I  1.486  1.387  108  104  96.7
1I  1.485  1.420  97  97  101.2
III  1.491  1.481  98  100  97.2
IV  1.489  1.445  97  99  104.9
1987
I  1.601  1.660  101  103  100.3
1I  1.597  1.679  95  94  102.8
III  1.608  1.678  94  96  102.9
IV  1.573  1.697  94  96  113.1
1988
I  1.575  1.717  116.7*
Source: AR87,  p. 53,  179.
a/ b/  Prices  of exports  and  imports  in domestic  market  relative  to  price
index  of domestic  uses.
In industry. Deflated  by dollar  price  of industrial  export  at effective
rate  for  export.
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